University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers

Wharton Pension Research Council

12-1-2018

Behavioral Finance, Decumulation, and the Regulatory Strategy for
Robo-Advice
Tom Baker
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Benedict Dellaert
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Finance Commons

Baker, Tom and Dellaert, Benedict, "Behavioral Finance, Decumulation, and the Regulatory Strategy for
Robo-Advice" (2018). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 2.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/2

The published version of this working paper may be found in the 2019 publication: The Disruptive Impact of
FinTech on Retirement Systems.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/2
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Behavioral Finance, Decumulation, and the Regulatory Strategy for Robo-Advice
Abstract
This chapter examines the regulatory and market structure concerns raised by automated financial
advisors, and arrives at two conclusions. First, the principles-based regulatory approach of the 1940
Investment Advisors Act in the U.S. appears adequate and sufficiently flexible to address the new issues
raised by automation, at least for now. Second, there is a pressing need to develop new mechanisms for
encouraging investment robo-advisors (and financial advisors generally) to provide high quality
decumulation services to their customers, because neither of the two prevailing compensation
approaches – assets under management and commissions – provides sufficient incentive at present, and
consumers are poorly equipped to evaluate the quality of decumulation services on their own.

Keywords
Investment Advisors Act, decumulation, asset management, regulatory strategy, market structure,
roboadvisor

Disciplines
Behavioral Economics | Finance

Comments
The published version of this working paper may be found in the 2019 publication: The Disruptive Impact
of FinTech on Retirement Systems.

This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/2

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 13/8/2019, SPi

The Disruptive Impact
of FinTech on
Retirement Systems
EDITED BY

Julie Agnew and
Olivia S. Mitchell

1

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 13/8/2019, SPi

3

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Pension Research Council,
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 2019
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2019
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019941415
ISBN 978–0–19–884555–3
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 13/8/2019, SPi

Contents

List of Figures
List of Tables
Notes on Contributors
1. How FinTech is Reshaping the Retirement Planning Process
Julie Agnew and Olivia S. Mitchell

ix
xi
xiii
1

Part I. Financial Technology and the
Retirement Marketplace
2. The Emergence of the Robo-Advisor
Jill E. Fisch, Marion Labouré, and John A. Turner
3. The Transformation of Investment Advice: Digital Investment
Advisors as Fiduciaries
Jennifer L. Klass and Eric L. Perelman

13

38

Part II. FinTech and Retirement Security
4. FinTech Disruption: Opportunities to Encourage Financial
Responsibility
Julianne Callaway
5. Ethics, Insurance Pricing, Genetics, and Big Data
Robert Klitzman
6. Beneﬁt Plan Cybersecurity Considerations: A Recordkeeper
and Plan Perspective
Timothy Rouse, David N. Levine, Allison Itami,
and Benjamin Taylor
7. Designing for Older Adults: Overcoming Barriers to a Supportive,
Safe, and Healthy Retirement
Cosmin Munteanu, Benett Axtell, Hiba Raﬁh, Amna Liaqat,
and Yomna Aly

61

75

86

104

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 13/8/2019, SPi

viii

Contents

Part III. New Roles and Responsibilities for Plan
Sponsors and Regulators
8. The Big Spenddown: Digital Investment Advice
and Decumulation
Steven Polansky, Peter Chandler, and Gary R. Mottola

129

9. Behavioral Finance, Decumulation, and the Regulatory
Strategy for Robo-Advice
Tom Baker and Benedict Dellaert

149

10. Matching FinTech Advice to Participant Needs: Lessons
and Challenges
Stephen L. Deschenes and P. Brett Hammond

172

11. The FinTech Opportunity
Thomas Philippon

190

Index

219

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi

Chapter 9
Behavioral Finance, Decumulation, and
the Regulatory Strategy for Robo-Advice
Tom Baker and Benedict Dellaert

This chapter surveys the decumulation services offered by investment roboadvisors as a case study with which to examine regulatory and market
structure issues raised by automated ﬁnancial advice. Based on this case
study, we reach two provisional conclusions. First, the principles-based
regulatory approach of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 appears adequate and sufﬁciently ﬂexible to address the new issues raised by automation, at least for now. Second, there is a pressing need to develop new
mechanisms for encouraging investment robo-advisors (and ﬁnancial advisors generally) to provide high quality decumulation services to their customers, because neither of the two prevailing compensation approaches—
assets under management and commissions—provides sufﬁcient incentive
at present, and consumers are poorly equipped to evaluate the quality of
decumulation services on their own.
After introducing investment robo-advisors, we provide a short introduction to decumulation, describing some of the uncertainties involved in identifying optimal decumulation strategies and sketching a few of the ‘rules of
thumb’ that ﬁnancial advisors have developed in this area in the face of this
uncertainty. Next we describe behavioral effects that could inhibit consumers
from following an optimal decumulation strategy, concluding that, left to
their own devices, consumers are likely to make sub-optimal decumulation
decisions. Then we describe some potentially useful automated decumulation services that are available on the market and present the results of a
survey assessing whether those services are offered by investment roboadvisors. Finally, we discuss market structures that may inhibit ﬁnancial
advisors from implementing optimal decumulation strategies for their clients
and explore whether there are regulatory strategies that could encourage
ﬁnancial advisors to provide better decumulation services. Two promising
strategies are (1) adopting a record-keeping requirement for robo-advisors
that is conceptually similar to the ‘black box’ requirement for commercial
airlines, and (2) developing a set of robo-advice ‘do’s and don’ts’ and related
input/output tests to conﬁrm that these requirements are met.
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Investment Robo-Advisors
We deﬁne a ‘robo-advisor’ as an automated service that ranks or matches
consumers to ﬁnancial products on a personalized basis. In the popular
press and the ﬁnancial planning community, the term ‘robo-advisor’ is most
often used to refer to automated investment services that assemble and
manage an investment portfolio for consumers. The technology, organizational structure, marketing, and many other aspects of investment roboadvising present a common set of public policy issues across the ﬁnancial
services sector (Baker and Dellaert 2018). In the present chapter, we focus
on investment robo-advisors, but some of the conclusions we draw also have
application in the insurance and banking contexts.
The intellectual history of investment robo-advice begins with modern
portfolio theory (Lam 2016), which provided a mathematically based and
empirically tested method for constructing and maintaining a passive investment portfolio on an automated basis. The resulting automated tools could
create portfolios, rebalance and otherwise modify them, and (for taxable
accounts) engage in tax loss harvesting. The modern asset management
industry makes these tools available to consumers in a variety of ways. In the
robo context, media attention has focused on the fully automated,
consumer-facing systems pioneered by companies like Betterment and
Wealthfront, and on the ‘hybrid robos’ offered by established asset managers like Vanguard and Schwab (the latter of which provides investors with
access to human ﬁnancial advisors in addition to direct access to automated
services). Nevertheless, traditional registered investment advisors also use
automated tools to construct and maintain portfolios for their clients on a
behind-the-scenes basis (FINRA 2016; SEC 2017a). Additionally, the
increasingly-popular target date funds (TDFs) typically are ‘funds of funds’
that use an algorithmic approach to portfolio management that could also
be considered an investment robo-advisor. Whether accessed directly or
indirectly, these robo-advisors have the potential to provide quality investment services at a lower cost than traditional ﬁnancial advising services
(Lam 2016; Baker and Dellaert 2018).

Accumulation and Decumulation
Modern portfolio theory and passive investing strategies have become
increasingly important to the asset accumulation phase of life-cycle investing,
ever since the historic shift to deﬁned contribution (DC) retirement plans
in the United States and elsewhere (Zelinsky 2012; Baker and Simon 2002).
This shift to passive investing did not occur overnight, but it is now widespread in ﬁnancial markets. Eventually, the shift may produce opportunities
for active investing that will slow, and then halt, the increase in the share of
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assets under management in passive funds. But even then, ﬁnance theory
and empirical research on market performance and investing behavior will
continue to play a signiﬁcant role in helping individuals manage the investment risk aspects of their DC retirement plans. One among many reasons is
that theory and research produce the investment strategies programmed
into investment robo-advisors.1
Finance theory and empirical research have had less of an impact in
helping individuals manage longevity risk or in managing other aspects of
the decumulation phase of life-cycle investing. Although retirement research
has contributed signiﬁcantly to our understanding of the ‘annuity puzzle’
(Benartzi et al. 2011; Yaari 1965), these and other insights have not yet
inﬂuenced decumulation advice comparable with the inﬂuence of ﬁnance
theory and research on accumulation. For example, despite repeated demonstrations of the theoretical beneﬁts of annuitization, only a very small
share (under 9 percent) of private US retirement assets are in annuity
reserves (Salisbury and Nenkov 2016).
This lack of inﬂuence may be attributable to the fact that researchers have
begun focusing on the decumulation phase of the life-cycle only relatively
recently (e.g. Mitchell and Moore 1997). Prior to the shift from deﬁned
beneﬁt to DC retirement plans, decumulation (or the avoidance thereof)
was largely of concern to the wealthy and, thus, of primary interest to the
wealth management industry, but not to retirement researchers or the social
welfare policy community. In the absence of authoritative guidance from
the research community, ﬁnancial planning professionals have yet to reach
as much consensus regarding decumulation strategies that they have
reached regarding accumulation strategies.
Providing decumulation advice involves guiding clients through numerous complex decisions including:
(1) Whether client assets should be annuitized and, if so, in what forms
and when;
(2) Assessing the potential exposures to uncertain, unavoidable costs
such as health care expenses, and the risk management strategies
that exist to address them;
(3) How much money can be withdrawn from the available assets each
year without unduly exposing people to the risk of outliving their
assets; and
(4) The order in which money should be withdrawn from different
categories of accounts.
Making the wrong decision can have dire consequences: causing
clients to draw down their portfolio too quickly, under-consuming when
their preference would be to spend, or losing money by choosing a
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poor annuity or Medicare insurance product. People can also purse a
tax-inefﬁcient withdrawal strategy. Broadly speaking, these decisions are
complicated because they depend on uncertain future states of the world,
they consist of many different components that are difﬁcult to understand,
and the clients making these decisions have heterogeneous needs and
preferences.
In the face of such uncertainty, ﬁnancial planners have developed some
rules of thumb about decumulation. The most famous is the ‘Bengen 4
Percent Rule,’ which stated that retirees who withdrew 4 percent of their
portfolios annually (adjusting for inﬂation) would not outlive their wealth
(Bengen 1994) (Bengen later revised his rule, suggesting that retirees could
withdraw 4.5 of their portfolio if the withdrawals were tax-free and 4.1
percent if the withdrawals were taxed; Scott et al. 2009). An alternative to
the 4 percent rule is a family of actuarial methods of spending advice which
incorporate the client’s life expectancy and adjust spending amounts each
year based on assets remaining in the portfolio.
The 4 percent rule has been criticized for several reasons. Some advisors
argue that retiree spending usually follows a ‘smile curve’ pattern, where
retirees spend more early on in retirement, less halfway through, and then
more again late in life. Also, retirees often face spending shocks—for
example from a hospitalization or other signiﬁcant health care event—
when they will need to withdraw an unusual amount to cover costs. As a
result, some ﬁnancial advisors consider it imprudent to recommend a
spending plan based around relatively constant spending. Financial advisors
also complain that the Bengen rule can be too conservative, leading clients
to chronically underconsume (e.g. JP Morgan 2014). Other ﬁnancial advisors contend that the Bengen rule is too aggressive in a long term, low
interest environment (Blanchett et al. 2013).
Another ‘rule of thumb’ in decumulation is the retirement withdrawal
sequence. Consider this excerpt from the Fidelity (2018: n.p.) website:
A straightforward strategy is to withdraw money from your retirement and
investment accounts in the following order:
Required minimum distributions (RMDs), from traditional IRA, 401(k), 403(b),
or 457 and Roth 401(k), 403(b), or 457 retirement accounts;
Taxable accounts, such as brokerage accounts;
Tax-deferred traditional IRA and 401(k), 403(b), or 457 retirement accounts;
Tax-exempt Roth IRA and 401(k).
Why in this order? First, it ensures that you take any RMDs if you’re older than
70½. (Roth IRAs don’t have RMDs while the original owner is alive.) If you don’t
take the full RMD, in most cases you’ll pay a penalty of half the amount you
failed to withdraw.
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While some ﬁnancial advisors recommend such a strategy, it may not be
optimal for everyone, especially for people whose top income tax bracket
changes over the course of their retirement (Cook et al. 2015).
These rules of thumb and debates about their reliability suggest three
important things about the development and dissemination of optimal
decumulation strategies. First, there remains signiﬁcant work to be done to
develop theoretically sound and empirically tested decumulation strategies.
Second, as even these simple rules of thumb demonstrate, decumulation
decisions involve calculation-heavy, future-oriented decisions that people
are not very good at making, but that algorithms can do quite well, provided
of course that there is an optimal decumulation strategy to follow. Third,
recent advances in optimal life-cycle portfolios (e.g., Horneff et al. 2009,
2015; Hubener et al. 2015; Chai et al. 2011) have yet to be incorporated in
much of the prevailing decumulation advice provided to consumers.

Behavioral Effects and Retirement Decumulation
An optimal decumulation model would maximize utility over the life-cycle
(Chen et al. 2017; Chai et al. 2011). Yet maximizing lifetime utility is a hard
problem to solve: it not only imposes large cognitive demands, but it also
requires people to make decisions that are subject to behavioral effects that
could lead to suboptimal decisions. In this section, we review various behavioral
effects that can impact individuals’ decisions regarding capital decumulation.
To do so, we follow a broad classiﬁcation of these effects into three domains that
reﬂect different aspects of individuals’ decision-making processes.
First, individuals draw on their knowledge of their situations, their larger
economic and social environments, and the alternatives that are available to
compose a mental representation of the decumulation decision that they face
(Johnson-Laird 1983). These mental representations are likely to be incomplete or inaccurate due to high cognitive costs that are involved in mentally
representing many different components (Gershman et al. 2015), or
because of emotional reactions to thinking about the decision, for example
because it involves contemplating death. As a result, individuals do not fully
and accurately anticipate the future (Huffman et al. 2017). These biases in
mental representations are the ﬁrst domain of behavioral effect.
Second, individuals must process information about the choice alternatives that are available to evaluate those alternatives. In particular, people
must make judgments about the attractiveness of each alternative based on
how well it matches their preferences (Lancaster 1966). This process is
unlikely to reﬂect the fully rational process underlying the normative
model (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992), among other reasons because

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi

154 The Impact of FinTech on Retirement Systems

individuals may have incorrect perceptions of the values of alternatives (e.g.,
they may overweigh certain probabilities), or they may have non-normative
preferences (e.g., they may be strongly loss averse) (Dimmock et al. 2016).
These evaluation-based biases constitute the second domain of behavioral
effects.
Third, individuals need to come to a decision by applying a decision rule
that allows them to compare and decide among alternatives (Payne et al.
1993). These rules are unlikely to reﬂect the fully rational process underlying the normative model, among other reasons because individuals can be
confused by the complexity or the sheer number of the alternatives that they
face (Chernev et al. 2015). The use of such non-normative decision rules or
heuristics constitutes a third domain of behavioral effects.
In the remainder of this section, we review speciﬁc examples in each of
these domains of possible behavioral effects to set up our subsequent
discussion of how automated advice can help individuals counter these
effects to make more optimal decumulation decisions. Note that while we
distinguish these three behavioral effect domains conceptually, they overlap
in practice. For example, the strength of the evaluation of a feature of an
alternative may inﬂuence whether this feature and alternatives are activated
in a mental representation and how the feature and alternatives are captured in
a decision rule.
Mental representation effects. One important way in which mental representations affect decisions is by making it easier or harder for individuals to
access relevant knowledge. For example, the availability heuristic refers to
the fact that individuals tend to confuse how easily they can recall an event
with the likelihood of the event occurring (Schwarz et al. 1991). Because of
these and other heuristics, mental representations are almost certainly
incomplete, biasing the decisions that individuals make using these representations (Hegarty and Just 1993).
Differential mental representation of the components that affect decisions can also generate behavioral effects. Recent research on construal
level theory is an excellent example of this mechanism (Liberman and
Trope 2008). For example, individuals may cognitively represent events
and alternatives that are further away in time (or some other dimension
such as space) differently than those that are close. These ﬁndings have
implications for retirement related decision-making as many decisions span
considerable periods of time (e.g., Van Schie et al. 2015; Gottlieb and
Mitchell 2015).
Goals represent a third aspect of mental representations that can affect
individuals decumulation decisions (Austin and Vancouver 1996). Depending on the goals that are activated in an individual’s mind, his evaluation of
alternatives and choice between alternatives may differ. For example,
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individuals who mainly think about the health consequences of aging may
assess their decumulation and other retirement alternatives differently from
individuals who mainly think about the fun and enjoyment that they can get
out of retirement. This may inﬂuence for example the investment, savings,
and insurance decisions that they make, such that individuals who are more
focused on potential health consequences may spend more on health
insurance and saving for health care support, while individuals who are
more focused on enjoyment may spend more on travel and regular housing.
Evaluation effects. In the evaluation domain, the best known behavioral
effects relate to the evaluation of risky alternatives (Tversky and Kahneman
1992). Individuals often exhibit biased perceptions of probabilities (e.g.,
probability weighting) and biased preferences for alternatives (e.g., loss
aversion), and they prefer not to choose alternatives when they lack information about the risks involved, or when they are not knowledgeable about
a speciﬁc domain (ambiguity aversion; see Fox and Tversky 1995; Borghans
et al. 2009).
Anticipated regret is another important example of behavioral effects in
the evaluation of alternatives. Research shows that regret avoidance can
impact individuals’ evaluations, for example by making inaction more
attractive than action, guiding behavior towards deviation from a normative
decision model (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). In retirement decisions,
individuals may fear experiencing more regret when the self-chosen option
turns out to be sub-optimal (Bodie and Prast 2012; Muermann et al. 2006).
Finally, individuals may exhibit non-normative inter-temporal discounting (trade-offs between the present and the future). For example, people
may too quickly discount future events compared to a normative discounting model, known as hyberbolic discounting (Laibson 1997). In particular,
in the context of retirement, individuals may discount future returns at a
higher rate than economic models would prescribe (Brown et al. 2017a).
This may lead them to commit less of their current income to long term
savings for retirement.
Decision rule effects. Another behavioral decision rule that can lead to
potentially suboptimal retirement decisions is acceptance of a default.
Default effects are often observed in the retirement investment domain:
for instance, Choi et al. (2003) showed that 56–87 percent of employees
participated in a 401k plan because of automatic enrolment, and these
employees tended to stick with the default contribution rate. Beshears
et al. (2009) showed that when a company changed its default retirement
savings rate for new employees from 3 to 6 percent, the participation rate
did not change, despite the doubling of the default rate.
In addition, decision rules may differ depending on the number of
alternatives that an individual faces. Research has also shown that more
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choice is not always better in terms of promoting individuals’ active decision
making. Sethi-Iyengar et al. (2004) illustrate that more individuals participate in a pension plan when fewer choices were offered. More generally,
individuals may avoid making complex decisions (Agnew and Szykman
2011; Brown et al. 2017b). When analyzing the savings contribution rate
and the asset allocation of a retirement savings portfolio, research has shown
that many individuals do not reallocate their investment funds throughout
their working lives (Beshears et al. 2009).

What do Robo-Advisors Say About Decumulation?
Next we identify automated decumulation services available on the market
and report the results of our survey of investment robo-advisors that provided these automated services. We included in our survey the two independent consumer-facing investment robo-advisors with the largest amount
of assets under management (Wealthfront and Betterment), two investment
company direct-to-consumer robo-advisors with the largest amount of assets
under management (Vanguard Personal Advisor Services and Schwab Intelligent Portfolios), two consumer-facing investment robo-advisors with a
target market of older Americans (United Income and True Link), and
two companies that provide automated decumulation tools for advisors
(BlackRock’s iRetire and Income Discovery). We included the latter companies because most general-purpose investment robo-advisors do not currently provide comparable automated decumulation services; thus, we had
to look elsewhere to gain insight into the kinds of decumulation robo-advice
available in the market.
Several automated decumulation services are available at present:
(1) Services that adjust the allocation of retirement assets as the expected
lifespan of the individual declines or milestones (such as stopping
work) are reached. This service is embedded in target date funds, is
presently offered by most of the consumer-facing robo advisors we
surveyed, and could easily be offered by the others;
(2) Services that assist individuals in making annuitization decisions. This
service appears to be presently available on an automated basis only
in decision support tools marketed to advisors;
(3) Services that help individuals optimize their social security claiming
decisions. This service is available in several consumer-facing investment robo-advisors and in one of the support tools marketed to
advisors. We consider this to be a decumulation service because the
timing of the social security claiming decision can have a signiﬁcant
impact on the lifetime value of social security retirement beneﬁts
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and, thus, on the amount of money available to an individual for
consumption in any given year;
(4) Services that help individuals optimize their Medicare plan selections
and predict their out-of-pocket medical expenses. This service is
available on private health insurance exchanges offered by health
beneﬁt companies such as Aon Hewitt and Willis Towers Watson and
(a less sophisticated version) at Medicare.gov. We consider this to be
a decumulation service because of the impact that healthcare expenses can have on ﬁnancial security (Hoffman and Jackson 2013),
the signiﬁcant differences in the beneﬁts available under different
Medicare plans (which can have a ﬁnancial impact that exceeds the
lifetime value of making the wrong social security claiming decision),
and the high level of difﬁculty involved in choosing among plans
without expert assistance (Handel and Kolstad 2016). Two of the
consumer-facing investment robo advisors have such tools in production, and two others implicitly recognize the importance of such tools
by offering human advice about Medicare choices.
(5) Services that help individuals with multiple retirement accounts determine which to draw from and when. This service is available from
certain robo-advisors and in advisor facing decision support tools.
(6) Services that help individuals calculate the amount of money they can
safely withdraw from savings to use for consumption on an ongoing
basis. This service is also available from certain robo-advisors and in
advisor facing decision support tools.
At the time of our survey, we found no investment robo-advisor offering all
these services. None of the consumer-facing robo-advisors surveyed offered
Medicare decision support tools, and none offered annuitization decision
support tools, although several of the robo-advisors employed human advisors who could provide advice about annuities and Medicare plans.
Some companies have developed software services embedding most or all
of these tools, but most sell the services to human ﬁnancial advisors. Accordingly, it appears that a well-equipped traditional ﬁnancial advisor can today
provide more complete decumulation services than can a robo-advisor. The
larger investment companies with robo-advisor services do offer all or most
of these decumulation services, but the fact that they do so in many cases
through humans providing general advice calls the quality of that advice
into question, at least in relation to computationally difﬁcult topics like
selecting the right Medicare plan and making the right annuitization
decision.
We should be clear that we are not criticizing the consumer-facing roboadvisors for business decisions about which automated services to offer. For
example, Wealthfront focuses entirely on Millennials who do not yet need
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decumulation services; we have no basis for second-guessing other ﬁrms’
decisions about what to automate and when. United Income and True Link
would seem to be the best candidates to offer all these services because of
their focus on the senior market, but they are new companies and are still
growing. (We note that United Income has most of the automated tools in
operation and has the two missing ones in production.)
In our survey, we coded the robo-advisors according to their characteristics within the following categories: business model, whether they receive
side payments, human assistance, whether asset allocation changes automatically with age, and whether they offer the following decumulation services:
a retirement income calculator, a social security decision tool, and a Medicare decision tool (see appendix for description of these characteristics and
the coding). The results appear in Table 9.1.

Robo-Advice Market Structure and Regulatory Issues
As our survey makes clear, robo-advisors have only recently begun to address
decumulation. None of the market leaders surveyed offered the full range of
automated decumulation services needed by someone depending primarily
on a DC retirement plan to fund retirement consumption. We expect that
expert knowledge about decumulation will increase signiﬁcantly over the
next decade, and that the quality of, and conﬁdence in, expert decumulation advice will rise. Because the advice will involve the kinds of calculations,
rankings, and predictions that can be automated and incorporated into
robo-advice services, robo-advisors are likely to play an important role in
disseminating that advice.
It is worth considering whether there are market structures offering the
potential to inhibit the development and dissemination of unbiased, highquality decumulation robo advice. If so, we also ask whether the existing
regulatory frameworks are adequate to address these market structures.
Robo-advisors present a contemporary example of the trilateral dilemma
in ﬁnancial regulation ﬁrst generalized by Jackson (2009). Like other ﬁnancial advisors, robo-advisors present a principal-agent problem, namely the
problem of agents whose interests are not fully aligned with the principals
that retain them. Robo-advice presents a trilateral principal-agent problem
because there are three categories of parties involved in the robo-advice
relationship: the client seeking the advice, the entity providing the advice,
and the companies providing the ﬁnancial products whose purchase is
affected by the advice.
Ideally, robo-advice would be fully aligned with consumers’ interests and
would aim to overcome the various behavioral decision-making challenges that
they face. Two of the main ways that robo-advisors can do this are: (1) using
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algorithms to solve complex optimization problems that consumers cannot
easily solve on their own; and (2) providing choice architectures and online
interfaces that help consumers develop a better understanding of their situations and make better decisions about complex decumulation products and
strategies (Baker and Dellaert 2018; Philippon 2019).
These two types of support have the potential to help consumers avoid the
behavioral limitations due to the behavioral domains identiﬁed above. In
the mental representation domain, a robo-advisor could consider all available options in the market, taking into account all key attributes of those
options and tailor the outcome to the individual’s circumstances. Roboadvisors could also provide consumers with empirically validated projections
of likely future developments in the ﬁnancial markets and in their own lives
(e.g., life span and medical expenses). In the evaluations domain, roboadvisors can allow consumers to systematically weight the attributes of the
options that they face, and robo-advisors can be designed to allow consumers to choose their own weighting. A robo-advisor can also offer digital
environments that help consumers better understand the options, including
future scenarios to allow more informed trade-offs between different attributes. Finally, in the decision rule domain, robo-advisors can offer balanced
decision rules that include all attributes of the different options and that
rank these options in order of predicted attractiveness to the consumer.
This would facilitate a decision-making process that focused the consumers’
attention on the most important options and attributes, helping them make
better use of their cognitive capacities (Dellaert et al. 2018).
Because decumulation decisions are so difﬁcult for people to make and
evaluate on their own, however, there is a concern that robo-advisors (like
their human counterparts) could selectively adapt the emerging expert
advice on decumulation to increase their compensation at the expense of
their clients. In that regard, ﬁnancial product companies may be motivated
to persuade advisors to be a less-than-fully faithful to their clients. Financial
product companies understand the ﬁnancial product domain much better
than the advisors’ clients. They also understand the behavioral effects described above better than those clients, so they can design their products to
exploit those effects. Moreover, because ﬁnancial product companies are
repeat players with advisors, they can monitor their advisors more effectively
than can the advisors’ clients, and they have greater ability to adjust the
terms of their contracts with the advisors in response to this feedback.
Even if robo-advisors steadfastly refuse to be inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial
product companies, there is still no guarantee that their interests will be
fully aligned with those of their customers. A more strategic, short-term
proﬁt-oriented type of robo-advisor could exploit the behavioral effects
to inﬂuence consumer decision making in a direction that is in the interest
of the advisor, but not of the consumer. For instance, in the mental
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representation domain, a robo-advisor might restrict consumer access to
available options in the market by only surveying a strategic subset of options
that are most proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. The advice could also focus on a
certain subset of attributes of these options that guide consumers towards
more proﬁtable options (e.g., by focusing on attributes correlated with
higher proﬁt margins), or provide projections of future scenarios that
highlight these attributes. In the evaluation domain, a robo-advisor could
selectively apply weightings to the evaluations of attributes that guide consumers towards more proﬁtable options. A robo-advisor could also apply
behavioral strategies such as framing and selective highlighting that make
consumers more sensitive to proﬁtable options for the ﬁrm. Finally, in the
decision rule domain, a robo-advisor could apply selective decision rules or
strategic defaults making it more burdensome for consumers to select their
most valuable options.
We are by no means making the claim that robo-advisors in the market are
currently applying these behavioral techniques, merely that there is ample
opportunity to do so and, based on experience in other markets, reason for
concern that some market actors will do so. For example, when Jackson
(2009) surveyed a wide range of ﬁnancial products and services from real
estate sales to ﬁnancial institutions’ sale of customer data to third parties, he
reported that, in every ﬁnancial product market considered, advisors were
receiving side payments from ﬁnancial product companies that had led (at
least some of) the advisors to act contrary to their clients’ interests. Not
surprisingly, lawmakers had intervened in all these markets except one to try
to align the advisors’ interests more fully with those of their clients, following
a modal regulatory strategy that combined ﬁduciary and transparency
obligations.2
Jackson (2009: 107–8) also raised concerns—which we share—about
whether these obligations were sufﬁcient to protect consumers, saying:
In contexts where the underlying problems arise—that is, where market forces
are not sufﬁcient to protect consumers—one wonders whether the mere imposition of ﬁduciary obligations, which typically call upon the recipients of side
payments to assess their reasonableness in light of numerous factors, is likely to
be effective. . . . One could raise similar concerns about generalized disclosure
regarding the existence of payments to consumers. It is hard to argue how
vaguely worded disclosure can assist most consumers.

This is the same regulatory strategy—disclosure plus ﬁduciary obligations—
that is the primary regulatory strategy today for investment robo-advisors.
Consumer-facing investment robo-advisors are subject to SEC registration,
supervision, and enforcement procedures under the Investment Advisers’
Act (SEC 2017a).3 The Act imposes certain ﬁduciary and transparency
obligations, often referred to in shorthand as ‘suitability’ and ‘disclosure’
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obligations, and it authorizes the SEC to examine advisors to determine
whether they are meeting those obligations. Although investment roboadvisors that sell their services to other ﬁnancial advisors are not subject to
this oversight directly, the SEC (2017a) can evaluate these ‘B2B’ roboadvisors when examining their ﬁnancial advisor customers (see also Mottola
et al. 2019 and Klass and Perelman 2019), as can FINRA (2016) when
examining the broker-dealers that it regulates.
In this short chapter, we cannot fully consider whether this principlesbased regulatory strategy makes sense for all ﬁnancial advisors, as this is a
larger question affecting much more than robo-advising. Instead, we focus
on how the known limits of this strategy interact with two special features of
the ﬁnancial advice we are examining here: the automated nature of roboadvice and the decumulation context.
Automation. The automated nature of robo-advice has several potential
consequences for a regulatory strategy that employs ﬁduciary and transparency obligations. First, the automated nature of the advice has the potential
to make the content of, and potential biases in, the advice more transparent
to regulators, both ex ante and ex post.4 This should be the case even with
hybrid systems (i.e., when there is a human who interacts with the client),
provided that those systems record both the automated advice and the
subsequent action, thereby permitting examination of the reasons for systematic variations between advice and action (in order to check whether the
human is introducing a bias—e.g., in favor of high commissions—not present in the automated part of the system). This provides reason to be
optimistic that the growth of robo-advisors will increase the ability of existing
disclosure and suitability requirements to mitigate the trilateral dilemma of
ﬁnancial advisors (Schwarcz and Siegelman 2015), provided of course that
regulators develop the expertise needed to examine robo advice (Baker and
Dellaert 2018; Philippon 2019).
Second, because the disclosures that consumer-facing robo-advisors make
to consumers are also automated, they should be subject to collection,
tracking, and comparison by third parties better-equipped than individual
consumers to evaluate and compare them. This second difference also
provides reason for optimism about improvements in transparency based
on existing disclosure obligations. Of course, if robo-advisors were to make
side payments to such third parties, this market development could simply
relocate the trilateral dilemma rather than mitigate it. For this reason, it will
be important to consider whether the receipt of such side payments is
consistent with existing ﬁduciary obligations and, if so, whether those obligations should be modiﬁed to regulate or even prohibit such payments.
Third, unless the robo-advisors themselves win the competition to
become consumers’ primary ﬁnancial platforms, the winners of that
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competition will receive recurring data feeds from robo-advisors and will be
able to monitor, compare, and report the robo-advisors’ ﬁdelity to their
customers. These platforms will also be subject to their own trilateral
dilemma, as all the ﬁnancial platforms of which we are aware are either
owned by, or receive side payments from, ﬁnancial product companies.
Accordingly, as with the more limited third-party advice platforms just
discussed, this market development may simply relocate the robo-advisor
trilateral dilemma. Thus, it will be important for regulators to monitor
developments in the ﬁnancial platform market and to consider whether
they have the authority they need to examine the business practices of the
entities that are likely to succeed and, if so, whether their existing statutory
authority provides them with the tools needed to protect consumers facing
this trilateral dilemma.
Fourth, because of the ‘weapons of math destruction’ problem—for
example, the problem of widely used models that turn out to have unanticipated ﬂaws—there are reasons to be wary of safe harbors and other prescriptive alternatives to ﬁduciary obligations in the context of automated
advice (O’Neil 2016). Especially because of the market concentration
potential of robo-advice, there is a signiﬁcant risk that a prescriptive
approach to robo-advice could lead to convergence on a single model that
could have negative effects as robo-advice scales. For this reason, as we have
argued elsewhere, regulators should consider relying on competitions (and
competitions of competitions) to enhance the quality of robo-advice, rather
than prescription (Baker and Dellaert 2018).
Decumulation. Decumulation services present different incentives for ﬁnancial advisors than asset accumulation services. The practice of paying fees
that are based on assets under management (AUM) is generally understood
to align the incentives of ﬁnancial advisors and their clients in the accumulation phase. Although the AUM fee structure gives advisors an incentive to
recommend excessive savings, most of the behavioral effects discussed earlier lead individuals to save less than would be optimal, making it unlikely
that investment advisors’ clients in fact generally save too much. Indeed, as
Barr et al. (2009) have argued, the market for saving products is an example
of a market in which the compensation incentives may reduce the negative
impacts of behavioral effects.
Decumulation services present a more difﬁcult alignment problem. As our
survey suggests, there is demand for decumulation services and some ﬁnancial
advisors provide those services, if only to stand out in the market for ﬁnancial
advice. Unfortunately, none of the existing models for ﬁnancial advisor compensation are well-calibrated to the quality of decumulation services.
On the one hand, AUM-based compensation partially aligns the interests
of ﬁnancial advisors with their clients’ interests in not outliving their assets.
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On the other hand, AUM-based compensation does not provide an incentive to recommend annuity products (because they reduce AUM), nor does
it provide any obvious incentives for other decumulation services, except as
needed to satisfy consumer demand in the advisors’ target market.
Commission-based compensation provides an incentive to offer annuities
and Medicare plans, but that incentive is not well tailored to quality. One
suggestive illustration of the lack of demand for quality can be seen in the
Medicare insurance market, in which, based on our scan of that market, we
conclude that the only advisors that are using available high-quality advice
tools are those whose clients are large employers that are transitioning
retirees from a traditional retirement health plan to a private exchange
and who demand high quality decision support for their retirees. (In that
regard it is worth noting that we learned from our survey that Vanguard is
developing its Medicare tools in cooperation with Mercer, which is one such
advisor (Thornton 2018)). Because individuals are poorly equipped to
evaluate the quality of decumulation services, the market does not appear
to provide incentives to develop high quality decumulation services. Moreover, because decumulation presents some difﬁcult modeling challenges
that have not yet been well-implemented in real-world models, there
remains signiﬁcant uncertainty about which decumulation strategies are
best for which consumers. These challenges include questions that are
purely technical, such as the potential role of loans in addressing large
unexpected expenses, or the special role of the home as a largely illiquid
asset that is not purely ﬁnancial in nature.
These challenges also involve questions that present a challenging combination of normative and behavioral considerations that may be hard to
elicit from retirees and may be highly heterogeneous, such as bequest
motives and the ability of individuals to adapt to changed circumstances
(which would affect the weighting of downside outcomes in a predictive
model). The resulting uncertainty presents opportunities for robo-advisors
(or ﬁnancial advisors choosing among robo-advisors) to take their own
interests into account in how they resolve that uncertainty in their models,
for example by recommending (or not recommending) the purchase of
annuities, or certain kinds of annuities, if doing so increased the compensation (or decreased the compensation) of the advisor.
As with automated investment advice more generally, the principles-based
approach of the Investment Advisers Act provides the SEC with authority to
examine advisors’ decumulation tools and perhaps even to raise questions
about why advisors are not making use of such tools, and FINRA appears to
have similar authority in the broker dealer domain (SEC 2017a; FINRA
2016). The SEC’s examination priorities now include ‘electronic investment
advice,’ and examinations ‘focus on registrants’ compliance programs, marketing, formulation of investment recommendations, data protection, and
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disclosures relating to conﬂicts of interest’ (SEC 2017b at 2). FINRA appears
similarly to have concluded that its existing authority is sufﬁcient for this
purpose. The FINRA Report on Digital Investment Advice identiﬁes ‘practices that we believe ﬁrms should consider and tailor to their business
model’ without the need for ‘any new legal requirements’ or change to
‘any existing broker-dealer regulatory obligations’ (FINRA 2016 at 1).
Thus, in our view, the difﬁcult challenge in moving forward along the
regulatory trajectory for robo-advice does not lie in obtaining the legal
authority to consider these questions (see also Klass and Perelman 2019).
Indeed, on the regulatory front, we are encouraged by Polansky et al.
(2019)). Although these authors are of course presenting their personal
views and not those of FINRA, their investigation of digital investment advice
and decumulation demonstrates that this important topic could easily be
put on the ﬁnancial regulatory agenda. Instead, the pressing decumulation
challenge lies in research and development, so that there can be the kind of
reliable ‘best practices’ regarding decumulation that FINRA referred to in
its 2016 Report.

Conclusion
The decumulation stage of the life-cycle presents difﬁcult theoretical and
behavioral challenges. The theoretical challenges lie in developing optimal
decumulation strategies given real-world tax, transfer, insurance, medical
care, and other institutional rules. The behavioral challenges lie, ﬁrst, in
recognizing the behavioral effects that could prevent consumers from following these strategies and that could be exploited by ﬁrms and, second, in
developing strategies to address these behavioral effects. Robo-advice,
whether provided direct-to-consumer or indirectly through human advisors,
has great potential in this regard, and our market survey demonstrates that
decumulation tools have begun to emerge. Moreover, recent SEC and
FINRA attention to digital investment advice indicates that ﬁnancial services
regulators have both the authority and the willingness to examine these
emerging tools.
Accordingly, we conclude this chapter with two concrete observations for
regulatory consideration. First, regulators could adopt a requirement that
Advisers and Broker Dealers only use automated tools that incorporate the
robo-advisor equivalent of the ‘black box’ that commercial airplanes carry to
record what happens on the plane and, thus, create and maintain a record
that will permit after-the-fact evaluation of any recommendation. Second,
regulators should begin the process of developing a list of simple
requirements—do’s and don’ts—for robo-advice, and for developing tests
to determine whether those requirements are followed. The inputs would
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be standard (but changing and secret) individual scenarios that could be
used to test whether the outputs vary in a manner consistent with the
requirements and to compare different advisor tools.
The ﬁrst approach would facilitate after-the-fact evaluation of failures, just
like black boxes on airplanes. Given the early stage of the development of
the technology and the signiﬁcant risks from adopting a highly prescriptive
ex ante regulatory approach, there is a need for an ex post liability
approach. A record-keeping requirement would facilitate that approach.
Like airline black boxes, comparable record-keeping practices are unlikely
to be implemented across the robo-advice market on a voluntary
basis, because of the potential liability risks such records could create for
individual ﬁrms. Thus, a black-box mandate represents a solution to a
collective action problem. This record-keeping requirement is important
because ﬁrms update their algorithms, models, and data sources over time.
Thus, absent a requirement to keep a record of exactly how a given
recommendation was made, it may be impossible for it to be determined
after the fact.
Our second approach is a concrete example of the ‘regulatory trajectory’
referred to in prior work (Baker and Dellaert 2018). Although it would be a
mistake to tightly prescribe the data sources and algorithms that robo-advice
must use (among other reasons because of the weapons of math destruction
problem discussed above), the efforts that the SEC and FINRA are undertaking to study automated advice are certain to produce actionable do’s and
don’ts. One beneﬁt of automated advice is that it can be tested in a way that
human advice cannot. While getting from here to there is obviously not a
simple task, policymakers should at the very least consider developing
simple input/output tests that their examiners can use to determine
whether those do’s and don’ts are being followed.

Appendix: Characteristics Used to Code
Robo-advisor Attributes
Business model. Categories are: independent consumer-facing investment
advisor (indep. B2C); fund company consumer-facing investment advisor
(FundCo B2C); fund company advisor tool (FundCo B2B2C); and independent advisor tool (SAAS B2B).
Side payments. Here we report what we could discern about whether the
advisor received payments from parties other than their customers that
could provide an incentive to bias the services. Categories are: none; fees
from related funds that are included in the asset allocation; and commissions from annuities.
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Human assistance. Categories are: Pure robo (no human assistance offered as
an option); Pure hybrid (human assistance always included at no extra
charge); Robo/hybrid (option to purchase human assistance); and Adviser
tool (automated tool licensed to human advisors for their use with clients).
Automatic reallocation. Here we report whether the asset allocation changes
automatically as individuals age or reach milestones (such as no longer
working). Categories are: yes, no, and advisor dependent. The latter category is for the advisor tools, which supplement whatever asset allocation
method the advisor is using.
Retirement income calculator. Categories are: yes or no. A ‘yes’ means the
service has an automated decision tool that recommends a retirement
paycheck or similar personalized spending recommendation, based on all
assets and income sources that the individual discloses.
Annuity support. Categories are: yes, no, human advisor. A ‘yes’ means that
the service includes annuitization options in the automated retirement
income calculator. A ‘human adviser’ means that human advisors who
work for the service can provide advice about annuitization.
Social security tool. Categories are: yes or no. A ‘yes’ means that the service
offers a tool that helps individuals decide when to claim and includes social
security income in any retirement income tool.
Medicare tool. Categories are: no, human adviser, and under development.
A ‘human advisor’ means that human advisors who work for the service can
provide general advice about Medicare plans. ‘Under development’ means
that the robo advisor informed us that they are working on an automated
decision tool that is similar to that presently offered through the Aon Hewitt
and Willis Towers Watson retirement health insurance exchanges.

Notes
1. Of note, the Department of Labor Rule regarding the use of investment roboadvisors in the employee beneﬁts context requires the robo-advisor to use ‘generally accepted investment theories that take into account the historic risks and
returns of different asset classes over deﬁned periods of time.’ Investment advice participants and beneﬁciaries, 29 CFR 2550.408g-1(4), https://www.law.cornell.
edu/cfr/text/29/2550.408g-1 (accessed March 2, 2019).
2. The one exception at the time was university ﬁnancial aid ofﬁces’ relationships
with private lenders, and that relationship is no longer an exception. (Barr et al.
2017)
3. State securities regulators have primary responsibility for regulating robo-advisors
with less than $100 million assets. Because of the economies of scale in roboadvising, we focus on federal regulation in this chapter.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi

168 The Impact of FinTech on Retirement Systems
4. Aspects of robo-advice that are based on machine learning models may be less
transparent because of the interpretability problems that accompany such models. We set those problems aside here for two reasons. First, our understanding is
that the current generation of investment robo-advisors uses intelligible models.
Second, this interpretability problem is a more general one that is receiving
signiﬁcant attention elsewhere (Selbst and Barocas 2018).
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